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Abstract
Railway systems occasionally get into a state of out-of-control, meaning that there is
barely any train is running, even though the required resources (infrastructure, rolling
stock and crew) are available. These situations can either be caused by large disruptions
or unexpected propagation and accumulation of delays. Because of the large number
of affected resources and the absence of detailed, timely and accurate information,
currently existing methods cannot be applied in out-of-control situations. Most of the
contemporary approaches assume that there is only one single disruption with a known
duration, that all information about the resources is available, and that all stakeholders
in the operations act as expected. Another limitation is the lack of knowledge about
why and how disruptions accumulate and whether this process can be predicted. To
tackle these problems, we develop a multidisciplinary framework aiming at reducing
the impact of these situations and - if possible - avoiding them. The key elements
of this framework are (i) the generation of early warning signals for out-of-control
situations using tools from complexity science and (ii) a set of rescheduling measures
robust against the features of out-of-control situations, using tools from operations
research.
1 Introduction
The phrase ‘no news is good news’ is particularly true for train operating companies; when
the railways do make the headlines of the daily news, the item is usually filled with images
of stranded passengers, overcrowded trains and blank information screens. These situations
are typically caused by very large disruptions, such as extreme weather conditions or power
shutdowns. Due to the complexity of railway operations, dispatchers have trouble react-
ing to these events, allowing the disruption to spread through the system. For this reason,
1
research in disruption management, aiming at providing dispatchers with computerized sup-
port for generating modified timetables, rolling stock and crew schedules after disruptions,
has recently received increased attention.
However, currently existing methods often require assumptions that severely limit their
applicability to very large disruptions, when effective rescheduling is needed the most. In
particular, the current state-of-the-art in railway disruption management is only able to deal
with isolated, well-defined disruptions. It is usually assumed that there is only one single
disruption such as a partial or complete track blockage, that the duration is known, that all
information about the resources is correct, and that all stakeholders in the operations act
as expected, Cacchiani et al. (2014) presents a broad range of examples. In practice, these
assumptions are not always met. Supposedly real-time management information systems
for the timetable, rolling stock and crew may lag behind, especially when disruptions cause
many deviations from the regular schedules. Next to that, train drivers and conductors may
not be aware or even ignore rescheduling decisions made by dispatchers. Furthermore, the
duration of a disruption often depends on the time needed for repairing malfunctioning or
broken infrastructure, which can take longer or shorter than expected.
In this research, we aim to reduce the gap between theory and practice by analyzing
situations where the shortcomings of current techniques are most prominent, so called out-
of-control situations. With this term, we refer to situations where the disruption causes
dispatchers to no longer have an overview over the system, limiting their abilities to make
viable rescheduling decisions. As a result, such a situation can eventually lead to the termi-
nation of all railway traffic in a large part of the railway network. Out-of-control situations
can arise after extreme incidents (e.g. power shutdowns in a major or crucial part of the
network) or combinations of large disruptions. In railway systems, these disruptions easily
accumulate and spread over the network due to the high utilization of the infrastructure
and strong links between resource schedules. In such situations, decision making becomes
slower and less effective due to the uncertainty in the disruption duration and the availability
of resources. On top of that, the decision making process may lack updated information or
manpower to adapt adequately to the situation. The decisions can then turn out unworkable,
leading to barely any train being able to run, even though all resources might be available.
In order to develop effective countermeasures that mitigate the impact of out-of-control
situations, it is necessary to better understand how multiple (primary) disruptions cause
large-scale problems. We focus here on delay propagation and amplification. The com-
plex interaction between various elements of the railway system (infrastructure, timetable,
rolling stock and crew schedule, dispatchers and information systems) ultimately lead to
amplification of delay on a large scale. Some attempts have been made to capture these
(Monechi et al., 2017), but disruption phenomena on the macro-scale have been proven hard
to capture. A data-driven approach is proposed to capture these interactions, exploiting
similarities between the railway system and other multi-layered systems, e.g. electricity net-
works (Buldyrev et al., 2010) or climate and vegetation systems (Tirabassi et al., 2014; Yin
et al., 2016). The generated insights can be used to develop new disruption management
techniques aiming to reduce the impact of out-of-control situations and, if possible, avoid
them.
The contribution of this paper is a multi-disciplinary framework for dealing with out-of-
control situations, comprising of two main parts. The first part involves the detection and
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prediction of large disruptions using tools from physics and complexity science (CS), with the
aim of providing dispatchers sufficient time for responding to the situation. Ultimately, this
allows us to study the evolution towards out-of-control situations and ultimately, to predict
them. The second part involves a number of countermeasures that can be applied in (near)
out-of-control situations, based on techniques from operations research (OR). The core idea
is to completely decouple the operations in the disrupted region from the rest of the railway
network. Next to that, we propose the use of self-organizing, local scheduling principles for
rolling stock and crew, which are robust for the features of out-of-control situations and also
relieve pressure of dispatchers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give a detailed
description of out-of-control situations, how they arise and what is currently done to prevent
them. In Section 3, we discuss the current state of the art of railway disruption management.
In Section 4, we describe the framework for dealing with out-of-control situations. We
conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Out-of-control situations
Extreme events can heavily disrupt the schedule of a train operating company. When this
happens, dispatchers are confronted with a very complex problem, as the affected number of
resources is large and typically, together with the duration of the disruption, uncertain. This
can cause gaps in the information flow, such that the decisions of dispatchers may be based
on outdated information, making the matter worse. In these situations, the railway system
can get into a state of out-of-control, which we qualitatively define as a situation ‘where
dispatchers cease to have an overview of the system and consequently decide to terminate
all railway traffic in the affected region, even though the required resources (infrastructure,
rolling stock and crew) might be available.’
Out-of-control situations usually occur after the amplification of multiple initial disrup-
tions. However, this process cannot easily be predicted, because the consequences of a
disruption vary a lot. Often the problem is confined to one particular train, track or train
line. In other situations, the disruption may propagate and be amplified through time and
space. An example is the case where the delayed train carries crew members that need to be
transported towards other trains, which then in turn will also delayed. These kind of ampli-
fication effects may lead to large-scale disruptions and eventually trigger an out-of-control
situation.
One of the most extended analyses of out-of-control situations can be found in a report
of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure after a harsh winter (Nederlandse Spoorwegen, Pro-
Rail, Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012), with multiple out-of-control situations
occurring in the Dutch railway system. As we will provide insights into out-of-control situ-
ations using the findings of this report, and will also give three examples of these situations
in the Netherlands, we now shortly discuss the organization of the Dutch railway system.
The Dutch railway system consists of about 7,000 kilometers of tracks. The maintenance
and management of the infrastructure is the responsibility of ProRail. Next to that, ProRail
is responsible for the timetable during the real time operations. Netherlands Railways (NS)
is by far the largest operator of passenger trains, handling over one million passenger trips
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each day. In the real time operations, NS handles the rescheduling of rolling stock of crew
and is responsible for providing the correct information to the passengers. Because of the
temporal density of the Dutch railway schedule, disruptions can easily spread. The decision
making takes place on nineteen different locations: five regional centers of NS, thirteen traffic
control centers of ProRail and one national control center.
Nederlandse Spoorwegen, ProRail, Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2012), find
three main causes of out-of-control situations in the Dutch railway system:
• The local nature of decision making. Because dispatchers have a locally restricted
area of authority, the global picture is not always available. For example, to reduce
workload, dispatchers might directly coordinate a route for a train through their area
without registering this train in the system; this leads to so-called ‘ghost trains’.
• The fragmentary decision making process. In the Dutch railway system, the decision
making is not only fragmented in terms of (spatial) area, but also spread across different
organizations and coordination levels.
• The loss of routine through the usage of all kind of additional measures on such days.
In the anticipation of extreme weather, timetables are often adapted prior to these
events. However, it is argued that this might have a negative impact in these situations,
because dispatchers normally strongly rely on their routine and experience with the
timetable.
It must be noted that these reported causes of out-of-control situations cannot only be found
in the Dutch railway system, but are actually features of many railway systems around the
world. For example, Schipper and Gerrits (2018), who compared the practices of disruption
management in find that the Belgian and Austrian railways have a similar level, and the
German railways a higher level of decentralization compared to the Dutch railway system.
Acting on the report of the Dutch ministry, many changes have been made in the Dutch
railway operations to reduce the chance for these events to emerge. The rescheduling proce-
dures have been reshaped in order to accelerate the decision making process. NS also refined
the reduced timetable that is used on days where extreme weather is expected. While this
certainly improves the controllability of the system, the downside of the reduced timetable is
that about 20% of all trains are canceled (even 50% in the Randstad, the densely populated
area in the west of the Netherlands), strongly reducing the transport capacity (Trap et al.,
2017). Furthermore, as the decision to operate the reduced timetable is based on weather
forecasts, in some cases it turns out that the measure was not necessary after all. Finally,
as illustrated in the next section, not all out-of-control situations are caused by extreme
weather conditions, again highlighting the inadequacy of the current approach.
2.1 Case studies
To illustrate how the railway network gets into a state of out-of-control, we next present
three case studies of such situations in the Dutch railway network.
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3 February 2012 - Winter weather
Extreme weather is a major factor in the triggering of out-of-control situations, since it often
causes multiple large disruptions around the same time. It is estimated that out-of-control
situations with causes related to extreme weather happened about ten times during the
period 2009-2012. The case of 3 February 2012 has been analyzed in a report to the Dutch
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (Nederlandse Spoorwegen, ProRail, Ministerie
van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012).
We start with some numbers from the mentioned report. On this day, there were 305
infrastructure disruptions (about two to three times more than usual), of which 20 where
switch disruptions that lasted more than half an hour. Furthermore, there were 250 prob-
lems with rolling stock, including six broken trains (daily average between one and two
trains). Also, an adapted timetable was used. The amount of delayed trains because of
missing personnel was 89, two times higher than usual. Throughout the day, there was an
increasing amount of schedule alterations performed by dispatchers. Another feature that is
typical for out-of-control situations is that the information flow contained gaps, especially
for passengers.
The evolution of the delay on the day is visualized in Fig. 1. Initially, the disrupted area
was confined around Amsterdam, but later spread towards Rotterdam and Roosendaal. At
the beginning of the evening, the delay even reached the far east of the Netherlands (En-
schede). Interestingly, the area between Utrecht and Den Bosch remained rather unaffected.
17 January 2017 - electric outage
Besides extreme weather conditions, there are also other causes of out-of-control situations.
An example of such a situation is 17 January 2017, when a power outage happened in large
parts of Amsterdam. The power was restored at 7:15. As expected, this disruption had a sig-
nificant impact on the railway traffic around Amsterdam during the morning. Incorrect data
in the information systems of ProRail and NS hindered all traffic to and from Amsterdam
until after 10:00. Furthermore, when the systems were up and running again, dispatchers
were faced with a very large workload since the resource schedules were heavily disrupted.
As a result, trains were running irregularly for the majority of the day. It eventually took
until 21:00 the regular service was restored (see Appendix for a visualization of the delay
evolution).
18 January 2018 - storm
Different from (general) winter conditions, storms have a more direct impact on the infras-
tructure, for example in the form of fallen trees. Early in the morning, there was a collision
with a person at Heerenveen, which resulted in some problems in the morning, seen in a
high-delay signature around Zwolle (Zl) (see Appendix for a visualization of the delay evolu-
tion). Soon after this, the storm kicked in and because of fallen trees and damaged overhead
lines, the fire department ordered the closing of several stations. Subsequently, the decision
was made to cancel all train activity up to 14:00. This got extended to 16:00, and ultimately
up to 17:00 no trains were running.
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Figure 1: Delay in seconds (tracks between service control points) on 3 February 2012, a
day with harsh winter weather. Data is smoothened for visualization purposes, by averaging
over neighboring segments. Some important Dutch cities are denoted: Amsterdam (Asd),
Amersfoort (Amf), Utrecht (Ut), Rotterdam (Rtd), Vlissingen (Vs), Roosendaal (Rsd), Den
Bosch (Ht), Nijmegen (Nm), Arnhem (Ah), Zwolle (Zl), Groningen (Gn), Enschede (Es) and
Maastricht (Mt).
Around 17:00, the storm had settled and dispatchers tried to restart operations. How-
ever, the limited overview of the whereabouts of rolling stock and crew strongly limited the
possibilities of dispatchers. For this reason, it was decided to broadcast a negative travel
advice for the rest of the day, even though the storm had already past.
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2.2 Comparison
The three cases reflect different evolutions of disrupted situations. During the first (3 Febru-
ary 2018), many trains still were running and the delay had a lot of time to spread across
the country. The second (17 January 2017) and third (18 January 2018) are cases where a
standstill of a large part of the system occurred. To put the three case studies in perspective,
we compare the total (summed) delay in shown in Fig. 2. It is visible that 17 January 2017
(red) on average returns to a normal state in the evening, while 3 February 2018 (black) kept
its disrupted state up to the end of the day. Furthermore, the gradual increase of February
18 2018 (orange) points to the standstill of some trains, but the cancellation of many others
(because the curve would be much more irregular otherwise). Also the positions of the total
delay maxima throughout the day varies on the different dates.
Figure 2: Total delay summed over the whole country (in seconds) for different dates with
(a) a regular, and (b) a logarithmic vertical axis. Colors indicate different dates. Temporal
resolution is 5-sec intervals. As a reference, ‘regular’ days are plotted in grey: 1 February
2018 through 14 February 2018 (winter days, but without significant problems). The average
with up to one standard deviation offset is shaded in grey.
Summarizing, we can say that in these out-of-control situations, the problems differ
greatly in shape, magnitude and time of the day. The spread of the delay depended on
whether parts of the network were shutdown. Comparing these events to regular days, one
finds that the accumulated delay on disrupted days may (on average) return to regular values,
but not always.
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3 Literature Review on Disruption Management
When a disruption occurs, the timetable, rolling stock circulation and crew schedule need to
be adjusted to obtain a new feasible schedule. Since solving this problem in an integrated
manner leads to unacceptably long computation times, the problem is, both in theory and in
practice, decomposed and solved sequentially. First, the timetable is adjusted. The modified
timetable then serves as input for the rolling stock rescheduling problem. Finally, both the
adjusted timetable and rolling stock schedule are input for the crew rescheduling problem.
It must be noted that such a sequential approach can lead to the situation where no feasible
solution exists for one of the later stages due to a decision made in an earlier stage. Hence,
it is sometimes necessary to resolve the timetabling or rolling stock rescheduling problem,
until an overall feasible solution is found (Dollevoet et al., 2017). Recent surveys of proposed
methods and algorithms for the different steps are presented in Cacchiani et al. (2014) and
in Ghaemi et al. (2017b).
3.1 Timetable rescheduling
Timetable rescheduling deals with finding a new feasible timetable by canceling, retiming,
rerouting or reordering trains services. Of the three rescheduling phases, timetable reschedul-
ing has received the most attention in the literature. Approaches differ in the type of incident
that has occurred (either a small disturbance in the timetable or a more serious disruption
such as a track blockage), in the level of detail the railway infrastructure is considered (either
macroscopic or microscopic) and in the extent the inconvenience of passengers is taken into
account. Objectives are usually to stay close to the regular timetable and minimize the total
or maximum delay.
Many microscopic approaches formulate timetable rescheduling problems as job schedul-
ing problems, in which a number of operations (the passing of trains) with certain operation
times (running times) have to be scheduled on machines (block sections), see e.g. D’Ariano
et al. (2007). In case of small delays, such models can be solved within a reasonable amount
of time by formulating them as job scheduling problems. Macroscopic approaches use a
higher level representation of the railway network, which has the advantage that additional
aspects can be incorporated. For example, Scho¨bel (2007) introduces the problem of delay
management, where one decides whether trains depart on time or should wait for delayed
feeder trains. The objective in delay management is usually to minimize the total delay of
all passengers combined. More recently, this problem has been extended with the routing of
passengers (Dollevoet et al., 2012) and the capacities of stations (Dollevoet et al., 2014).
Only a few contributions consider timetable rescheduling after larger disruptions. Louw-
erse and Huisman (2014) introduce the problem of finding a new timetable in case of partial
or complete blockades. Additional constraints are added to increase the probability that
a feasible rolling stock schedule exists for the modified timetable. Veelenturf et al. (2015)
extend this model by considering a larger part of the network, allowing rerouting of trains
and incorporating the transition from the regular timetable to the modified timetable and
back. Ghaemi et al. (2017a) propose a different mixed integer programming formulation for
the same problem, incorporating railway infrastructure on a microscopic level. In a follow-up
paper, Ghaemi et al. (2018) study the impact of uncertain disruption duration estimations
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on the rescheduling strategy and passenger delays by combining the rescheduling model with
a passenger assignment model and a probabilistic disruption time prediction model.
3.2 Rolling stock rescheduling
The rescheduling of rolling stock calls for adapting the rolling stock circulation to the mod-
ified timetable by changing the compositions of certain trains. Sometimes, this implies that
shunting movements are canceled or that new shunting movements are introduced. In case
no train units are available, train services must be canceled. Hence, the goal is usually to
minimize a combination of the number of canceled trains, the number of changed shunting
movements and the difference with the planned end-of-day inventory at the stations.
Nielsen et al. (2012) present a rolling horizon approach for rescheduling rolling stock.
In this approach, the rolling stock is rescheduled periodically, as information about the
disruption is updated. The model used is based on a mixed integer programming formulation
of the rolling stock scheduling problem proposed in Fioole et al. (2006). Kroon et al. (2014)
use the same model but also take passenger flows into account when rescheduling the rolling
stock. Since disruptions can cause passengers to take different paths, their model tries to
facilitate this change in demand by adapting the rolling stock schedule. To solve the problem,
the authors iteratively compute a rolling stock schedule and simulate the corresponding
passenger flows, until a satisfactory overall solution is found. In Veelenturf et al. (2017) this
model is extended by also allowing small timetable adjustments, namely introducing stops
of trains at stations where they would normally not call. Haahr et al. (2016) compare the
composition model used by Nielsen et al. (2012) and Kroon et al. (2014) with a path based
model and conclude that both models are fast enough to be used in rescheduling contexts.
3.3 Crew rescheduling
When the timetable and rolling stock schedule are updated, it is known which tasks need to
be executed by the train drivers and conductors. Crew rescheduling involves assigning these
tasks to the crew members. Often, many changes are necessary to the crew schedules as
disruptions cause many duties to become infeasible. For example, a train driver on a delayed
train might arrive too late for his next task, such that this task must be performed by a
different train driver. Many (labor) restrictions need to be respected when reassigning tasks,
the most important one being that a crew duty should always end at the planned crew base.
If a task cannot be assigned to any crew member, it must be canceled. This is especially
undesired for driving tasks, as this requires the rolling stock schedule to be updated once
more. Therefore, the objective in crew rescheduling is usually minimizing the number of
canceled tasks and changes to duties.
Huisman (2007) addresses crew rescheduling in the context of scheduled maintenance
operations. As the number of possible duties is very large, the problem is solved using a
combination of column generation and Lagrangian relaxation. Potthoff et al. (2010) consider
the crew rescheduling problem when a disruption has occurred that causes a blockage of a
route. To keep the problem size tractable, first a core problem with a limited number of
tasks is solved. In case the solution contains canceled tasks, tasks that are in some sense
close to canceled tasks are added to the core problem. This process is repeated until all tasks
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are covered or a time limit is exceeded. Veelenturf et al. (2012) extend the crew rescheduling
problem by also allowing retiming of trips. This increases scheduling flexibility, such that
more tasks can be covered. In Veelenturf et al. (2014), uncertainty with respect to the length
of the disruption is taken into account by requiring that duties have feasible completions in a
number of different scenarios. A completely different approach to crew rescheduling is taken
by Abbink et al. (2010). In this paper, train drivers are represented by driver-agents. In
case the duties of some drivers have become infeasible, the driver-agents try to solve this by
swapping tasks between drivers.
3.4 Takeaways
As is clear, there is a vast amount of literature on disruption management for railway systems.
However, only a few contributions (Ghaemi et al., 2018; Nielsen et al., 2012; Veelenturf et al.,
2014) take the uncertainty that comes with major disruptions into account, at least to some
extent. Furthermore, the largest disruptions that are considered in the literature are complete
blockages of one route for a number of hours. For larger (combinations of) disruptions, the
performance of current models is unknown. On top of that, the effectiveness of the proposed
methods is completely dependent on the data accuracy in information systems and the
willingness of stakeholders to cooperate, two assumptions that are often violated in case of
larger disruptions. These observations lead us to the conclusion that the current state-of-
the-art of railway disruption management is unable to cope with out-of-control situations.
4 Framework for dealing with out-of-control situations
As we have seen in the previous section, existing disruption management techniques are
ineffective when it comes to preventing or reducing the impact of out-of-control situations.
Therefore, in this section we propose a new framework for dealing with out-of-control situ-
ations. The framework is visualized in Fig. 3. It contains six steps, which can be divided
into two parts. In the first part, tools from CS are used to generate early warning signals in
case an out-of-control situation is likely to occur, and to determine which part of the net-
work is most affected. In the second part, techniques from OR are used to find appropriate
rescheduling measures, with the aim to prevent the out-of-control situation and maintain a
high quality service. Of the six steps that the framework contains, only Step 3 can be solved
using existing methods. For all other steps, new methods need to be developed.
The key concept of the framework is the disrupted region. In Step 2, this region is
identified and completely decoupled from the rest of the network, i.e. no trains or crews are
allowed to move from the disrupted region to the non-disrupted region or vice versa. As
a consequence, passengers who need to travel from within the disrupted region to the rest
of the network or the other way around can do so by transferring at one of the boundary
stations. This drastic measure is taken in order to isolate the disruption and to prevent it
from propagating further through the network. Furthermore, by decoupling the appropriate
disrupted region, it can be assumed that outside the disrupted region complete information
is available, such that we can use tailored disruption management strategies for both parts.
It must be noted that a possible seventh step of the framework would be to recouple the
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Monitoring Effective measures
(Complexity Science) (Operations Research)
Step 1: Anticipate amplification
using early warning metrics
Step 3: Reschedule the
non-disrupted region
Step 2: Identify and isolate the
disrupted region
Step 4: Modify line system inside
the disrupted region
Step 5: Schedule resources inside
the disrupted region
Step 6: Manage the passenger
flows
Figure 3: The proposed framework for dealing with out-of-control situations.
two parts and transition back to the regular timetable once the disruption is over. However,
such an operation is highly complex and could easily lead to repeated loss of control. Hence,
the safest option is to maintain the two parts separate for the rest of the day. During the
night, sufficient time is available to set up the resources again in order to start the regular
timetable the next day.
In the remainder of this section, we will consider every step in more detail and indicate
how techniques from CS and OR can be used to support the decisions that are required to
be made in every step.
Step 1 Anticipate amplification using early warning metrics
In order to prevent out-of-control situations from happening, it is essential to provide dis-
patchers with early warning signals for these situations, giving them sufficient time to respond
and take the necessary measures. In Complexity Science literature, early warning signals
are derived in different manners. The most common approach is to look at statistical met-
rics like increased autocorrelation and variance (Scheffer et al., 2009; Thompson and Sieber,
2011). These are quite established in physical systems, but cannot directly be applied on
the railway system due to its high degree of heterogeneity and discontinuity of processes.
Therefore, we suggest the creation of a statistical model.
The statistical model would contain all dynamic interactions of all delayed trains across
an area. Finding these dynamic interactions is difficult for a number of reasons. First and
foremost, the railway system is highly heterogeneous, meaning that the interaction between
trains are situationally different - lines, train type, train direction, infrastructure capacity
consumption, number of crew members and exogenous factors such as accidents or technical
problems all distinguish one situation from another. Second, the behavior of people involved
(drivers, dispatchers, passengers, emergency services) is not necessarily systematic. And
third, the system comprises of multiple network layers (infrastructure, rolling stock, train
crew and an information/decision network) instead of one. Large-scale disruptions may
amplify stronger in these kind of systems, as seen in the example of a major disruption in
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the Italian intertwined electricity-internet network (Buldyrev et al., 2010).
There are attempts in literature to capture these systematic dynamics. Monechi et al.
(2017) analyzed railway logistics from Germany and Italy, and found a number of dynamic
interactions, one of which is backward propagating delay. Kecman and Goverde (2015) used
Dutch railway data and focus on quantifying parameters of running and dwell times, which
are important (fluctuation-driven) uncertainties in microscopic models. Goverde (2010) made
an analytical approach of describing the system, using the timetable and parametrization of
quantities like dwell times to make a forward integration model. Furthermore, Ball et al.
(2016) showed the equilibrium diagram of a simple model when connecting the rolling stock
layer with a crew layer, illustrating the effect of interdependent networks. These papers
illustrate different approaches to define structural railway dynamics, but there is no overall
consensus on a macroscopic approach (Monechi et al., 2017), making it hard to make accu-
rate predictions for large disruptions. Looking to applications in other fields, CS provides
many examples of systems in which the specific dynamics are not fully known or where the
interactions are highly heterogeneous. For example, Sebille et al. (2012) used a transfer
matrix method to predict the movement of plastics in the ocean. Another example is the
interaction between forest and savanna systems, where Hirota et al. (2011) showed various
types of macroscopic pattern formation.
Trying to apply these existing methods onto the railway system, distinguishes two levels
of statistical models. First it should be emphasized that we will treat delay as the state
variable: the propagation and amplification of delay can be seen as a proxy of the magnitude
of problems in the railway system. A first-order model would contain mainly advection and
diffusion of delay, which can be derived from (lag-corrected) correlations or using more
advanced methods like singular spectrum analysis. These processes give a first hint on how
the effects of one specific disruption spreads through the network. A second-order model
would also contain dynamic interactions: in the case of multiple disruptions, interactions
may lead to amplification effects. It is necessary to take these effects into account, because
these are important in the growth of out-of-control situations. This second-order model can
be derived by analyzing the macro-evolution of delay, which is for example captured in a
so-called transfer matrix (as in Sebille et al. (2012)), which is calculated directly from data.
Using methods as described above, allows for the prediction of the evolution of delay in time,
which (depending on the robustness) allows the application of early warning metrics.
Step 2 Identifying and isolating the disrupted region
The region that is decoupled from the rest of the network is referred to as the disrupted region.
The boundary of this region is not trivially given by one single metric (e.g. accumulated
delay), because multiple logistic factors are important to consider when decoupling any
region from the rest of the system.
First and foremost, one needs to consider if it is necessary to decouple a region at all.
If early warning indicators anticipate a large disrupted system, there are many alternative
countermeasures to consider and the system might also remain controllable (although dis-
rupted). Second, in some situations (e.g. when a station is completely disrupted), several
stations or tracks may be forced to be at the boundary of the disrupted region. Third, one
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needs to identify tracks that have a large impact on the propagation of the delay throughout
the country. By removing all dependencies along these diffusion regions, the spread of delay
will strongly be reduced. These tracks can be identified using the statistical models used to
create the early warning signals. Fourth, the amount of rolling stock within the disrupted
region, and outside of the disrupted region needs to be considered. Locking a large disrupted
region when there are very few trains in the area reduces the efficiency of the logistics. Fifth
and finally, the size of the control area should not be too large as the service level within
the region is likely to be lower compared to the rest of the network, since self-organizing
strategies will be used to schedule the resources within the disrupted region. But it also
should not be too small, because the robustness of the self-organization may drop if there is
not room for adaptation.
Step 3 Rescheduling the non-disrupted region
Outside the disrupted region complete information is available, so conventional disruption
management techniques can be applied to reschedule the railway traffic in this part of the
network. The rescheduling of the crew is the most complicated, as crew duties must end
at their fixed base and it is likely that crew members outside the disrupted region have
their base inside the disrupted region (and vice-versa). This problem can be addressed by
for example imposing that the duties of such crew members should end near the boundary
between the two regions and taking into account the expected time it takes for them to
travel back to their base. An additional challenge is that, from the perspective of the non-
disrupted region, the separation of the two regions can be considered as a combination of
track blockages, a disruption that has not yet been considered in existing literature. Since
computation times are likely to increase with the size of the disruption, dedicated (possibly
heuristic) algorithms need to be developed in order to find good solutions in a reasonable
amount of time.
Step 4 Determining a modified line system for the disrupted region
When the disrupted region is decoupled from the rest of the network, it is unlikely that
the original line system, specifying which lines are operated at which frequencies, can be
maintained. This has two main reasons. Firstly, as the platforms at the boundary stations
are divided among the disrupted and the non-disrupted region, and turning a train takes
more time than simply continuing in the same direction, the railway infrastructure is unlikely
to allow for the same number of trains as in the regular line system. Secondly, as there is
only a limited amount of rolling stock available within the disrupted region at the time of
decoupling, and trains are not allowed to transfer between the regions, it is possible that
there is insufficient rolling stock available to operate the regular line plan. As such, it is
certainly necessary to modify the line system for the disrupted region.
Evidently, a model for modifying the line plan should take both the infrastructure and the
available rolling stock into account, effectively moving line planning from the strategic to the
operational setting. As few existing line planning models take the available infrastructure
and rolling stock into account (see Scho¨bel (2012)), this problem asks for novel mathematical
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models, (partially) integrating timetabling and rolling stock scheduling into the line planning
problem.
Step 5 Scheduling rolling stock and crew in the disrupted region
Since out-of-control situations are characterized with great uncertainty regarding the exact
whereabouts of the rolling stock and crew, it is not possible to communicate detailed in-
structions to the crew. Instead, the idea is to provide a strategy on what task to do next.
This way, we reduce the dependence on central traffic controllers and avoid having to wait
for clearance from dispatchers that are faced with incomplete information.
Given that in the previous step a workable line plan is generated, it should be possible
to find appropriate strategies that restore a stable service in the disrupted region as soon
as possible. Simple principles could be used to determine when trains should depart after
arriving at a station, and which rolling stock units are used to operate the different lines.
For the scheduling of the crew, more intricate strategies are required, as some crew members
eventually need to exit the disrupted region in order to end at their base, and the other
way around. By employing agent-based modeling, the best performing strategies can be
identified.
Step 6 Managing the passenger flows
In the sixth and final step of the framework, the passenger flows are managed. Since the
line plan in the disrupted region is adjusted, passengers also have to be routed differently
through the network. Furthermore, since the disrupted region is not operated using a fixed
timetable it will be a challenge to provide the passengers with proper information on how to
travel to their destination.
5 Conclusion
Many methods have been proposed over the years for rescheduling railway systems after
disruptions. However, in out-of-control situations, which are characterized by a very large
number of affected resources and a high degree of uncertainty, these methods are less effective.
In this paper, we proposed a new multidisciplinary framework for dealing with such situations
to close this gap between theory and practice. In coming years, we plan to further develop
the steps in this framework, and test its performance using simulation and serious gaming.
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Appendix - Delay evolution of other case studies
(a) 8:00 (b) 12:00
(c) 16:00 (d) 20:00
Figure 4: Delay evolution on January 17, 2017, a day with electric outage in Amsterdam.
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(a) 8:00 (b) 12:00
(c) 16:00 (d) 20:00
Figure 5: Delay evolution on January 18, 2018, a day with a severe storm that caused the
deliberate shutdown of a large part of the network.
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